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Do You Know Where Your Identity Is? Personal Data Theft Eludes Easy Remedies
choicePoint, a consumer data vendor,
handed the personal information of
least 145,000 people to criminals posing as
small businesses. Hackers swiped the personal
information of 32,000 people who use the database
Lexis-Nexis. Bank of America lost backup tapes containing
1.2 million federal employee
records. Every day, it seems, a new identify theft
incident is reported (or occurs, without being reported)
followed by new rounds of questions: Should data vendors
be regulated? Can identity theft hurt e-commerce?
How do individuals protect themselves? Unfortunately,
suggest Wharton faculty
and others, no simple answers are available, especially
when personal information
is so easily available through search engines.
The cost of identity theft continues
to escalate. According to a Federal
Trade Commission survey released in
September 2003, the latest year available,
nearly 10 million Americans have
been victims of some form of identity
theft, resulting in $47.6 billion in damages
accruing to businesses. Victims
spent an average of 30 hours trying to
fix the damage and suffered losses totaling
$5 billion.
Those figures are likely to grow in
the future, given the number of incidents
reported so far this year. In addition,
because a recent California law
requires any company that operates in
the state to disclose when personal information
is lost, incidents continue to
surface at a rapid clip: On March 8, for
example, DSW Shoe Warehouse reported
the theft of purchase information
and credit card numbers from shoppers
at 103 stores. Separately, California
State University at Chico disclosed that
hackers lifted personal information,
such as names and Social Security numbers,
from a housing and food service
information system.
"Without that California law, we
would not have heard of any of these
breaches," says Kendall Whitehouse, senior
director of information technology
at Wharton.
Meanwhile, Senator Diane Feinstein, Democrat from
California, proposed a bill on January 24 that would
require companies nationally to disclose when
customer data has been breached. Modeled after
California's state law, the bill was proposed
in the last Congress, but never made it into law,
says Howard Gantman, director of communications
for Feinstein. This time, he adds, "We are hopeful of passage."
Indeed, notes Wharton operations
and information management professor Eric Clemons, the bill
stands a good chance of getting through because of the increasing
incidents of identify theft and the public's frustration
with the fallout. "You must have recourse against the
people responsible for the theft," says Clemons.
"There has to be data responsibility."
At the same time, some observers worry that a
law targeting firms that peddle data could
end up restricting commerce. John A. Greco, Jr., CEO
of the Direct Marketing Association, noted in a
statement that "a delicate balance must be struck"
to prevent identity theft, yet allow customers
of data vendors to get information needed to issue credit,
verify data and process transactions quickly.
Others, however, predict that better
security won't hurt the speed of commerce.
If anything, says Wharton legal
studies professor Dan Hunter, a decrease
in identity theft will actually help
commerce. That's because as companies
increasingly disclose data breaches,
identity theft may start to hinder online
purchasing. "The spate of ID thefts is
hardly likely to convince my grandmother
that she really needs to start
buying online," says Hunter.
But for now, consumers are not yet annoyed
enough about identity theft to push for tighter
regulation. Consumers see identity theft as
"just one of those things," says Hunter.
"As long as it doesn't happen to them, they assume it won't."
The Need to Disclose
Breaches
According to Clemons, the security
breaches at ChoicePoint and Lexis-
Nexis could tip the scales in favor of
Feinstein's bill. Indeed, while Clemons
initially wasn't in favor of a national
law on identity theft disclosure, he
now believes one is necessary. Without
a law forcing disclosure and/or penalties
for data leaks, companies aren't
going to worry about protecting data,
he suggests. Why? Because companies
that currently leak information aren't
responsible for damages. Financial institutions
pick up most of the tab for bank
fraud, stolen credit card numbers and
the like. "If 100% of the damages were
paid by the guy who allowed the data
to be stolen, there would be a different
attitude about security," says Clemons.
"Disclosure makes sense, and some
financial sanctions would probably be
appropriate as well."
Hunter agrees that a law is necessary,
but notes that legislation will have a
tough road given resistance from marketing
companies that rely on building
profiles for their business. And companies
like ChoicePoint, which are largely
unregulated today, are not going to
welcome laws governing their security
policies. In addition, Hunter says, attitudes
about personal data integrity
need to change. "We have this bizarre
idea that data collected by companies is
their 'property' based on the theory that
they collected or bought it. Therefore,
they can do what they want with it. Yet
if we took a moment to recognize the
sorts of social and individual costs that
entirely blameless people have to bear
when their identity is stolen, we would
institute higher standards on security,
access and editing of people's personal
identifying information."
Clemons says a national law is warranted
for three reasons: First, identify
theft is becoming financially significant
and a matter of grave concern to
consumers. Second, disclosure gives
individuals and their financial institutions
time to protect themselves and
can provide fair warning for these parties
considering that the bulk of the financial
risk is carried by them. Indeed,
Whitehouse notes, giving consumers
time to react to identity theft is one of
the biggest reasons to pass Feinstein's
law. "I think consumers need to be
informed quickly," so they can "report
the theft to credit agencies and thereby
minimize the risk of danger. Without
disclosure you only find out when the
fraud happens. That's too late."
Third, there is no downside to disclosure
aside from the embarrassment suffered by companies
that have to admit leaks. A disclosure law would at
least reassign some of that risk by tarnishing the
reputation of the parties that either caused the
damage or allowed it to occur.
For example, since ChoicePoint's
security problems surfaced, the company
has exited a business selling data
such as Social Security and driver's
license numbers unless there is specific
consumer-driven transaction or benefit,
or unless the products support federal,
state or local government and criminal
justice purposes. ChoicePoint has also
appointed Carol A. DiBattiste, currently
deputy administrator of the U.S.
Transportation Security Administration,
to be the company's chief credentialing,
compliance and privacy officer. "These
changes are a direct result of the recent
fraud activity," said ChoicePoint CEO
Derek Smith in a statement.
Identity Theft: Easy
and Often
So why does identity theft seem like a
snowball rolling downhill? Because it's so easy.
Once personal information
hits the Internet, it doesn't go away. According to
Hunter, a little time spent on Lexis-Nexis can turn
up property records, taxes paid and other personal
information. "Until we recognize that personally identifying
data is valuable as an aspect of an individual's
life, not just as part of the bottom line of companies like Reed-
Elsevier (the parent of Lexis-Nexis), we are going to
wake up to a new violation approximately every three
days," says Hunter.
But the real issue is, who needs
a Lexis-Nexis account when Google is available? Joshua Pennell,
CEO of IOActive, a Seattle-based security company,
was recently at a law enforcement
conference illustrating how easy it is to find personal
identifiers using Google. "With Google, it doesn't matter
if you are an evil hacker,
says Pennell. "Anyone can do it." He turned up
more than 1,000 records, in addition to such documents
as corporate
personnel reviews, Excel spreadsheets
and scanned passports. How did this data get to the web?
Companies, or individuals, put the documents there
assuming no one would see them. "What we have here is a
cultural issue," says Pennell. "You can have all the
firewalls in the world, but if you post documents on the web they will
be seen. Security is lax."
That's why Pennell says a law could boost security.
"To bring cultural change, we are going to have to make
companies air dirty laundry. Who wants to tell the world
they lost your information?" David Farber, a former University of
Pennsylvania professor of information
science who is now at Carnegie Mellon,
says the Internet makes it easy to pick
up little bits of information and piece
them together to assume someone's
identity. Personal data on the web is
like the genie that won't go back into
the bottle. "The fact that we are living
in a networked world makes this a lot
harder to deal with," he says.
Fixing the Problem
Because identity theft is a) easy, and b)
the result of lax corporate procedures,
consumers and companies with personal
data have to meet each other halfway to
prevent ID theft, says Farber.
"Corporate procedures need to be changed,
and consumers
have to watch their data." On the consumer
side of the equation, Farber echoes many
others who have advised individuals to shred documents and refrain
from giving out personal information.
He uses one credit card for online transactions
so that he has to cancel only one when his security
is compromised. He also doesn't respond to emails asking
for information such as credit-card and Social Security
numbers, and he checks credit reports regularly.
Until either data aggregators become more secure,
or legislation forces companies
to be more vigilant about data, the onus
is on the consumer to protect personal
data. Clemons says if a consumer gives out
just one nugget of information, a thief can
build on it. "A thief can use simple, readily
available information like a Social Security
number, phone number or parent's name to
establish" an identity, and "then get increasingly
more sensitive information very easily."
On the corporate side, it's unlikely
there will be much movement without
regulation on the federal level, Clemons
suggests. Why? In the absence
of penalties tied to data mishaps,
there's not a big return on investment
to justify beefing up security. "There was
no return on investment on pollution
control until legislation and litigation
reassigned much of the cost of pollution
back to the pollution creators," says
Clemons. Similarly, investments
to "plug holes" will be made "the first
time that a data aggregator is assessed the
full financial damages caused to banks and
credit card issuers by its failure to protect data." In economics,
the current setup for data aggregators
is known as an "externality," says Clemons.
"One party enjoys the benefits while another bears the costs."
Technology as Magic
Bullet?
Although technology has arguably
made identity theft easier, can it also be
better used to secure information?
Not really, says Whitehouse. The key
to protecting identity is building a
system with multiple layers of security.
To get to data, someone should have to
go through tiers of security procedures.
Adding more security would require two
things: consumer acceptance and new
procedures for financial transactions.
The rub is that this solution isn't popular,
especially if, for example, it takes a
little longer to get credit approved.
Clemons explains that something as simple
as losing a password would become more inconvenient.
"Since it would be harder to establish that
you are you, it would be harder to establish
your right to your password," he says.
Other solutions would be to no longer use
Social Security numbers as identification,
to frequently change passwords and to use
virtual credit card numbers that change
with each online purchase so that real numbers
aren't revealed. If all of those solutions are
integrated with information systems, the value
of leaked data approaches
zero, says Clemons.
Since those solutions
aren't going to happen overnight, consumers
are left with little to ease their pain, except
maybe a prayer that their identity
isn't stolen, says Hunter. "This area is a
genuinely filthy can of worms. And it's not going to get better anytime
soon."
Originally published by
Knowledge@Wharton April 20, 2005
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